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Abstract 
New societies require social polities based upon renewed ethical values. We are 
witnessing the regeneration of the ethical models that nourish social policy in a more 
inclusive manner, being more acquiescent with diversity than are the classical social 
contract and justice theories. This paper examines the regeneration of these ethical 
foundations from contemporary paradigms of thought, such as Martha Nussbaum 
and Amartya Sen’s, in contrast to the ones proposed by Rawls and contractarianism. 
Special focus is put on the problem of dependency in our societies. The conclusions 
drawn advocate for an inclusive social contract that embraces the diversity of human 
functionings and capabilities. This work also discusses the reasons why a 
regeneration of ethical models shaping the theories of justice, which are the core of 
our social order, is essential. 
Keywords: social policy, dependency, capabilities approach, Martha Nussbaum  
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Resumen 
Las nuevas sociedades demandan formas de organización social fundamentadas en 
valores éticos renovados. Asistimos, hoy, a la renovación de los modelos éticos que 
sustentan las políticas sociales desde paradigmas más inclusivos y mas 
condescendientes con la diversidad, que las hasta ahora vigentes teorías del contrato 
y de la justicia social clásicas. Este artículo trata de la renovación de estos 
fundamentos éticos desde paradigmas de pensamiento contemporáneo como el de 
Marta Nussbaum y Amartya Sen, así como de las carencias que presentan los 
modelos clásicos como los propuestos por John Rawls y el contractualismo. Se hará 
especial referencia al problema de la dependencia en nuestras sociedades y se 
concluirá en la necesidad de pensar las bases de un contrato social inclusivo que 
abarque la diversidad de funcionalidades humanas y de capacidades. Y se postulará 
la necesidad de renovar los modelos éticos que fundamentan las teorías de la justicia 
que son la base del nuestro ordenamiento social. 
Palabras clave: política social, dependencia, enfoque de las capacidades, Martha 
Nussbaum
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he political principles we choose to shape society reflect an image 
of who we are and how we want to live. The ethical foundations 
that we use to evaluate wrong or right policies or the appropriate 
development of society inspire these principles. Justice, equity, equality, 
freedom or autonomy are among these fundamental moral principles. The 
debate on the meaning of these concepts is now more vibrant than ever. The 
turn of political theory towards moral philosophy and the revival of ethics in 
the public realm, which has been pointed out by Rawls, Habermas, Rorty, 
Vattimo, Dworkin, Sandel, Nussbaum and Sen, among others, is due to at 
least two main factors: the excessive economism prevailing in political 
principles and, in turn, the search for a democratic regeneration to update 
these political principles (Habermas, 1997)1. 
Actually, Amartya Sen’s work in the UN was aimed at finding indicators 
to measure human well-being and freedom. The Indian Nobel Prize-winning 
economist insists that life quality and well-being go beyond productivity and 
income level. The limitations of the GDP as a development indicator are 
revealed when the increased economic growth does not improve citizens’ 
quality of life in many countries (Stiglitz, Sen, & Fitoussi, 2010).  
In the same vein, Martha Nussbaum’s works introduce moral philosophy 
in the field of development economics. She aims at finding political 
principles that are more detached from exclusively economic goals. These 
principles, Nussbaum holds (2006; 2011), must be inspired by ethical 
paradigms that understand human nature from less rationalist and utilitarian 
approaches. The American philosopher makes a critique of Rawls’s theory 
of justice, which follows the traditional contractarian approach that 
envisages society as a mere association of independent individuals keeping 
contractual relationships driven by selfish calculation. Nussbaum’s 
organicist conception of human nature is inspired by Sen, Aristotle and 
Marx. The human being is a developing creature that needs society to live 
and realise their capabilities and functionings. To this end, society must be 
able to provide all citizens with enough opportunities (Nussbaum, 2000) on 
an inclusive basis.  
In this paper, we analyse the main aspects of Nussbaum’s critique of the 
limits of one of the most influential theories of Western political philosophy: 
the social contract theory and its updated version in Rawls’s theory of 
T 
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justice. We explain how the capabilities approach, developed by the 
professor of Ethics and Law, can provide a more inclusive conceptual 
framework that embraces a conception of justice that allows countering 
inequity and exclusion in society. These problems demand theoretical 
changes, the first of which must be the revision of the political principles 
that exclude people with disabilities from citizenship. Finally, we analyse 
how the influence of development economics –Sen and Nussbaum– in moral 
philosophy has led to an anthropological turn in the understanding of human 
nature closer to the classical Greek concept –Aristotelean– of humans as 
social beings; a vision that relies on values of sociability, cooperation, 
capabilities and functionings.  
 
The Capabilities Approach in the Context of Human Development 
Theories 
Sen and Nussbaum’s capabilities approach offers an ideal normative 
framework to evaluate the extent of individual well-being, assess equity in 
public policy and develop human nature. The term capabilities conveys the 
human being’s potentialities, substantial freedoms at their disposal to 
develop the functionings that allow for fulfilment and well-being 
(Nussbaum, 2011). Although Sen and Nussbaum agree on this definition, 
they differ in other aspects of the theory. For instance, Sen prefers the term 
functioning2 to capability, and defines capability as the possibility to achieve 
valuable functionings that improve citizens’ qualifications and 
productiveness with greater life opportunities (Sen, 1987, p.46). For 
instance, when defining poverty, Sen makes reference not to lack of wealth 
but to lack of capability development. Here development is not economic 
growth but the process of providing individuals with opportunities to 
develop their capabilities and achieve good living standards.  
The starting point of the capability approach is the critique of utilitarian 
and liberal conceptions that link development and well-being to 
consumption and distribution of wealth. Both the economist3 (1992) and the 
philosopher4 (2000) insist that quality of life and well-being are determined 
by the extent of capability development, rather than by the income level. It is 
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not about utility but opportunity to convert commodities at our disposal into 
valuable achievements:  
Equal incomes can go with significant differences in wealth. Equal wealth 
can coexist with very unequal happiness. Equal happiness can do with 
widely divergent fulfilment of needs. Equal fulfilment of needs can be 
associated with very different freedoms of choice. And so on. (Sen, 1992, 
p.2). 
In fact, the capability approach was developed within the context of 
human development theories. Such theories state that development cannot be 
measured only by economic indicators but by the quality of life. Quality of 
life involves development of education, healthcare, resources and income, of 
course. In this line, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
published the first report on human development based on Sen’s studies5.  
This first report on human development introduced the Human 
Development Index (HDI). The HDI measures the average achievements in 
a country, focusing on the ends rather than the means (namely, GDP) of 
development and progress. The HDI is calculated from national data on life 
expectancy at birth, adult literacy rate, gross enrolment ratio for primary, 
secondary and tertiary schools, and GDP per capita6. Actually, these 
dimensions of life quality (life, health and education) constitute three 
fundamental capabilities that all societies must guarantee and develop in 
their citizens. The HDI reveals which countries offer more freedom and 
development to their people:  
People are the real wealth of nations. Indeed, the basic purpose of 
development is to enlarge human freedoms. The process of development 
can expand human capabilities by expanding the choices that people have 
to live full and creative lives. (UNDP, 2004, p.127). 
 
The Capability Approach Theory in the Context of Social Justice 
Theories 
In this state of affairs, the capabilities approach has become a conceptual 
theoretical framework not only to measure development but also to lay the 
foundations of a new social justice theory. The American philosopher 
144 Guirao – Fundamentos éticos de las políticas sociales 
 
 
demonstrates that the capabilities approach provides good indicators for 
human development as well as an excellent framework for building up a 
theory of basic social justice. The central capabilities, such as health, life, 
education or nutrition, are key to the quality of life for all people, and 
therefore, she contends, they cannot be reduced to a single numerical scale 
(Nussbaum, 2011). 
Nussbaum disagrees with Rawls on his conception of primary goods. She 
considers that equality in the distribution of goods does not meet the 
diversity of needs and capabilities of human beings. Here we must 
differentiate the distribution of goods from the capability to use them, 
because some people may fail to convert resources into valuable outcomes. 
This argument is in keeping with Sen’s thought when he defines poverty as 
capability deprivation.  
In Frontiers of Justice, philosopher Martha Nussbaum analyses the 
reasons why three groups are excluded from Rawlsian justice theory. These 
often-disregarded groups are animals, economically underdeveloped nations 
and people with disabilities (Nussbaum, 2006, p.23). We will focus on the 
different treatment given to people with disabilities or the dependent. This 
demand of equality is similar to that of women. According to Nussbaum, to 
solve this problem we first must envision a new way of thinking of 
citizenship and human beings.  
One of the most conflicting points between both theories is precisely the 
conception of citizenship and the prerequisites of the individuals who choose 
the legal principles of the political community. John Rawls (1999) imagines 
an ideal scenario where all citizens have the same powers and capabilities7. 
In this situation of ideal equality, the just distribution of primary goods8 is 
guaranteed but both Nussbaum and Sen claim that such isonomy deserves 
more attention. First and foremost, because human beings differ in their 
capabilities and powers, even in the ideal situation suggested by 
contractarian approaches. Human beings are different in their capabilities 
and needs and, therefore, it is necessary to acknowledge the differences prior 
to the opening of a debate on equality. It happens that up to Sen and 
Nussbaum’s works, all justice theories striving for equality, by means of 
utilitarianism or fair distribution of goods, assumed uniformity in the needs 
of individuals. They took little note of a fundamental fact: we human beings 
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are different from one another and diversity is not a secondary difficulty that 
can be disregarded or a variable that can be implemented later, but a key 
aspect in equality studies: 
Human beings are thoroughly diverse. We differ from each other not only 
in external characteristics (e.g. in inherited fortunes, in the natural and 
social environment in which we live), but also in our personal 
characteristics (e.g. age, sex, proneness to illness, physical and mental 
abilities). The assessment of the claims of equality has to come to terms 
with the existence of pervasive human diversity. (Sen, 1992, p.1).  
In both Sen and Nussbaum, the capabilities approach envisages each and 
every person as an end in themselves and takes no notice of total and 
average well-being in society. Instead, what actually counts are the 
opportunities available to each citizen. Nations and public policies are urged 
to enhance every person’s living standards by providing the framework 
where capabilities can be developed. In his Inequality Reexamined (1992), 
the Indian economist makes two relevant critiques of egalitarianism, 
focusing on Rawlsian theories: the heterogeneity of human beings and the 
multiplicity of variables for evaluating equality (Sen, 1992, p.1).  
On the other hand, while acknowledging that she pursues Rawls’s 
footsteps along political liberalism, Nussbaum builds up her capabilities 
approach in the form of a dialogue and continuous critique of the Rawlsian 
concept of contract. This theory supports that the legal principles in a society 
are the result of a contract aiming at the mutual advantage between rational, 
“free, equal and independent” individuals. Let us examine this in more 
detail.  
 
Contractarianism and the Principles of Exclusion 
The belief that all men are rational and reasonable, which is inspired by 
Kant’s deontological ethics, underlies contractarian justice theories. There is 
a traditional division of two main currents of ethical thought: material and 
formal ethics (Kant, 2012). The former nourishes ethical action and pursues 
moral good. As moral good is conceived differently depending on the 
individual, there are several currents of thought within material ethics 
ranging from Aristotle to utilitarianism. On the contrary, in formal or 
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deontological ethics, moral action is based on universal formal principles 
that bind everyone with no exception. These a priori principles are not 
imposed by God, religion or governing authorities, but by pure reason.  
The problem arises and exclusion occurs when moral autonomy and 
reasonability, which are presupposed capacities in moral action, also become 
necessary criteria to be a party to the contract. As Nussbaum points out, 
Kantian moral elements in Rawls and contemporary contract theorists9 are a 
grave limitation to justice, as they differentiate first-class citizens from 
second-class citizens.  
My aim is to present a conception of justice which generalizes and carries 
to a higher level of abstraction the familiar theory of the social contract as 
found, say, in Locke, Rousseau, and Kant (...) the guiding idea is that the 
principles of justice (...) are the principles that free and rational persons 
concerned to further their own interests would accept in an initial position 
of equality as defining the fundamental terms of their association. (Rawls, 
1999, p.10).  
 
Being free10, independent11 and equal12  (this rules the dependency cases 
out) are the a priori requirements of the parties to the contract, as Nussbaum 
(2006) underlines. Moreover, Rawls establishes that the principles of justice 
as fairness also require that these free, equal and independent persons be 
concerned to further their own interests, this is, the engine of social 
cooperation is based on self-interest. Therefore, we can highlight three 
controversial points in Rawls’s theory of justice: the original position or the 
circumstances of justice, the attributes of those who engage in the social 
contract (free, equal and independent), and mutual advantage as the purpose 
of social cooperation.  
 
The Original Position or the Circumstances of Justice 
 
It is a hypothetical situation13 where Rawls finds the above-mentioned 
principles of justice, which are selected by individuals situated behind a veil 
of ignorance (no one knows their class position, assets or gender). Rawls 
establishes a list of hypothetical principles –heterogeneous, in Sen and 
Nussbaum’s critiques– that range from material assets to human dignity. So 
far so good. But we run again into the core issue. Rawls, like all 
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contractarian theorists, presumes that all human beings are roughly similar in 
mental and physical powers and they are all free, equal and reasonable in 
their choices, which is not true. As pointed out by Sen (1992), Rawls 
distributes primary goods by assuming that all human beings have similar 
needs. Therefore, the theory of justice as fairness is flawed in this 
presumption though not in the theory.  
Furthermore, the original position excludes people with special needs, as 
they do not have ‘normal’ mental or physical abilities. But it is not clear that 
having ‘normal’ capacities entails ‘normal’ rights. In other words, equality in 
capacities may not lead to equality in rights (or in morale). Therefore, 
equality in capacities is no guarantee of equality in rights (Nussbaum, 2006). 
The problem arises when standards of rationality are brought up when 
defining human beings. Actually, Rawls acknowledges some doubts 
regarding the inclusion of disabled people in the concept of global justice. 
He is trapped in a vision of the human nature that values humans mainly for 
their rationality. This vision is predominant in Western society since 
Nietzsche’s interpretation of the history of philosophy, and was started by 
Socrates, developed by Plato and Christianism, and culminated with Kant 
and the Enlightenment. As a matter of fact, Kant’s approach to human 
dignity leads to the exclusion of the disabled from this concept, which is a 
paradox, as Nussbaum contends, because dignified treatment is given only to 
those who are equal in mental and physical powers but not to those who are 
equal in humanity. To sum up, neither classical nor contemporary 
contractarian theories can solve these problems, not even their best version 
developed by Rawls.  
Kant’s influence is also noticeable in the hypothetical situation of the 
original position in Rawls’s theory of justice. In this state of nature or 
original position, it is difficult to provide an account of the dynamics of 
being the subject of justice (those who choose just principles) and being the 
object of justice (those who benefit from just principles). In other words, 
who designs the basic principles of society? Who are the addressees? To 
Nussbaum’s view, all contract theories share this structural feature and 
misunderstand both questions (Nussbaum, 2006). Contractarians conflate 
primary subjects or recipients of justice with those who choose the principles 
of justice for all, and they specify certain abilities (language, minimum 
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moral capacity and willingness to be cooperative) as prerequisites for 
participation in the procedure that chooses principles. Persons with physical 
or mental impairments do not meet these criteria, and we are again before a 
double exclusion. We are referring to reiterative social exclusions of the 
disabled from the very foundations of society, which leads us to the second 
fundamental objection.  
 
Free, Equal and Independent 
 
Nevertheless, not all citizens are free, equal and independent throughout all 
their lives. Anyone can suffer a disease or become unemployed or 
dependant. Such relevant issues on dependency are disregarded from the 
foundations of the system. Therefore, the state has to intervene afterwards by 
means of public policies that can eradicate exclusion14. It is necessary indeed 
to think of the groundings of social justice from a different paradigm, but it 
is not easy to alter contract theories without affecting their basic principles: 
free, equal and independent. Obviously enough, one cannot make a contract 
without rationality. However, it is also obvious that rational capacity is not a 
prerequisite for citizenship. We need a Copernican turn in the 
anthropological vision of human nature. The way to begin, Nussbaum 
suggests, when we think about fundamental principles, is to think of the 
human being as a creature characterized by sociability (Aristotle, 1959). This 
leads us to the third critique of the justice theory.  
 
Mutual Advantage as the Purpose of Social Cooperation 
 
All contractarian theories envisage a concept of human nature that lies 
precisely in the need for a social agreement. Most have a vision that is close 
to the Hobbesian conflict and the pursue of self-interest (Locke, property) or 
common benefit (Kant, we all respect others so that we are respected too). In 
this way, justice only makes sense when the state of nature is abandoned and 
an agreement for mutual advantage is reached15. The idea of mutual 
advantage, accepted by Rawls, is central to the social contract tradition: the 
contracting parties leave the state of nature for mutual advantage 
(Nussbaum, 2006, p.156).  
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Nussbaum makes a direct critique of Rawls’s assertion that mutual 
advantage is the origin of the principles of justice, since the pursue of justice 
must be based on justice itself rather than mutual advantage. She also claims 
that the capabilities approach does not secure mutual advantage because 
justice is a valuable common good that is pursued for its own sake 
(Nussbaum, 2006). But human beings can be cooperating out of a wide 
range of motives: love, pity, benefit of course, but also the love of justice 
itself.  
The person leaves the state of nature (if, indeed, there remains any use for 
this fiction) not because it is more mutually advantageous to make a deal 
with others, but because she cannot imagine living well without shared 
ends and a shared life. Living with and toward others, with benevolence 
and justice, is part of the shared public conception of the person that all 
affirm for political purposes. (Nussbaum, 2006, p.158).  
 
Conclusions. Towards a New Conception of Human Nature: Man is a 
Social Being 
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach provides a theoretical framework that 
envisions human nature based on values of social cooperation and moral 
duty to the citizens who are not fully cooperating members of society. She 
states that a comprehensive theory of justice must ensure reciprocity and 
respect to individuals with impairments, even with a grave mental disability. 
The American philosopher holds that human beings are creatures, social 
animals, characterised by sociability and her non-Kantian account of human 
dignity: a dignified and decent life. Sociability, she contends, encourages 
man to cooperate for survival and development rather than for benefit.  
In practice, the exclusion of people with disabilities from the foundation 
of political principles leaves aside a great deal of relevant issues related to 
social justice: support centres, the value of care and caregivers, the costs of 
integration in labour market and education, public policies for capability 
development, etc. They are invisible, as women were not long ago. These 
complaints are relegated to the private life, which is none of the State’s 
business, especially in a liberal system.  
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But ignoring human vulnerability is a mistake from the point of view of 
justice and our societies’ principles. We all have chances to end up in a 
dependency situation. The capabilities approach understands nature in such a 
way that human weakness is not disregarded at all. Individuals, alone, are 
vulnerable. They need society to develop and grow and to pass through 
several stages where they are unavoidably dependent. If they grow old, they 
will possibly develop physical and mental impairments. MacIntyre, another 
voice of contemporary philosophy, approaches dependency from a socio-
political dimension, envisaging vulnerability as inherent to human nature. 
MacIntyre tries to foresee: 
A form of political society in which it is taken for granted that disability 
and dependence on others are something that all of us experience at certain 
times in our lives and this to unpredictable degrees, and that consequently 
our interest in how the needs of the disabled are adequately voiced and met 
is not a special interest, the interest of one particular group rather than of 
others, but rather the interest of the whole political society, an interest that 
is integral to their conception of their common good (MacIntyre, 1999, 
p.130). 
In this sense, the capabilities approach provides a wider coverage and is 
encouraged by the Aristotelian idea that there is something wonderful and 
worthy in any complex natural organism. The starting point of the approach 
is that a worthy life is based on authentically human functionings, and 
human beings are beings in need of a rich plurality of human life activities 
that cannot be reduced to the fair distribution of resources and primary 
goods. Human beings have different needs of resources and different 
abilities to convert the same resources into functionings. As a matter of fact, 
“a society that does not guarantee these fundamental entitlements to all its 
citizens, at some appropriate threshold level, falls short of being a fully just 
society, whatever its level of opulence.” (Nussbaum, 2006, p.75).  
Nussbaum justifies a list of ten capabilities16 (Nussbaum, 2011, p.33-34) 
as central requirements of a life with dignity17 that all societies must secure 
to a certain level (note again that this concept of dignity differs from Kant’s). 
These are political principles that must be shared, guaranteed and 
implemented by all nations. Nussbaum supports that “the appropriate 
political target is capability and not functioning” and insists on “a rather 
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strong separation between issues of justification and issues of 
implementation” because the former leave room for human freedom 
(Nussbaum, 2011). In fact, the structure of the theory is outcome-oriented, 
focused on human development, rather than procedures. This is how this 
approach departs from formalist contractarian theories, and in particular, 
Rawls’s justice theory, which assumes that a correct and fair outcome, social 
justice, necessarily results from a correct and fair procedure. And here again 
we have the dilemma between the formal and the material, Rawls’s 
formalism versus consequentialism, which supports that a political scenario 
is proven right if results turn out to be good. Although Nussbaum insists that 
hers is not a consequentialist theory, the fact that some strong principles of 
social justice are achieved by securing development to a minimum threshold 
level does not match any deontological approach (Nussbaum, 2011). 
In turn, the capabilities approach provides a more inclusive vision of 
human nature that does not exclude anyone from justice principles, for it 
starts from a conception of man as a social animal that needs society to live. 
The Aristotelean view of man as a political animal, zoon politikon (Aristotle, 
1959), means that human beings were made to live in the polis, the city, to 
develop their human nature, because one who lives outside the society is 
either a beast or a god. On the other hand, this is such a Greek idea that 
Socrates is brought back to mind. He did not want to live outside the polis 
because his main interest was to go to the theatre and discuss his ideas with 
his contemporaries. That is why he took hemlock to die and avoid ostracism, 
for he knew he would become a beast, this is, lose his humanity. But this is a 
different story. 
 
 
Notes 
1 The prevailing economism in political principles has drawn the attention of different 
disciplines, from moral philosophy and political theory to economic science. We cannot 
contribute the debate here. Among all the above-mentioned authors, Habermas is a key 
representative of the critique of the reduction of politics to economic dimensions.  
2 Martha Nussbaum prefers the term capabilities to functionings, because the former is less 
utilitarian and reflects better her understanding of the principles of justice, as we will see later 
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on. On the contrary, Sen thinks that “a functioning is an achievement of a person: what he or 
she manages to do or to be. The capability of a person is a derived notion. It reflects the 
various combinations of functionings (doings and beings) he or she can achieve. Capability 
reflects a person’s freedom to choose between different ways of living” (Sen, 1992). 
3 Nobel Prize-winning economist Amartya Sen, in the Tanner Lectures held at Standford 
University, delivered his speech Equality of What? In 1979, where he presented his 
conception of capabilities for the first time.  
4 “Instead of asking about people’s satisfactions, or how much in the way of resources they 
are able to command, we ask, instead, about what they are actually able to do or to be. Sen 
has also insisted that it is in the space of capabilities that questions about social equality or 
inequality are best raised” (Nussbaum, 2000). 
5 The Human Development Index was developed by Pakistani economist Mahbub ul Haq, 
working alongside Sen in the early nineties. It was Sen’s idea that well-being and 
development should rely upon the development of citizens’ fundamental capabilities 
(Pressman & Summerfield; 2000). 
6 In 1996, the UNDP published the first attempt to measure poverty. The Capability Poverty 
Measure was a new indicator inspired by Sen’s works, a multidimensional index of poverty 
focused on three basic dimensions of human development: health, literacy and reproduction.  
7 Otherwise, the legal principles legitimising differences could be established, as it happens in 
dictatorships.  
8 Heterogeneous list of basic needs that any person would wish to accomplish their life goals.  
9 Although classical and contemporary contractarian theorists deal with the circumstances of 
the social contract and the origin of society, they differ in their vision of human nature, the 
circumstances of the agreement and the political justification of the State (Fernández García, 
1983). Classical contractarianism was born in the 17th and 18th centuries with Rousseau, 
Hobbes, Locke and Kant. It states that the principles of society are the result of a social 
contract originated in a hypothetical state of nature (Rousseau) or original position (Rawls), 
meaning an initial situation of equality in which individuals refuse to use force for peace’s 
sake and to get mutual advantage. This contract is the inception of the civil society (Locke, 
Kant) and the State (Hobbes). 
10 Free in the Lockean sense: no one submits to others involuntarily. According to Kant, 
everyone is entitled to pursue happiness. Equal in social contract theory means that the parties 
to the contract start negotiations in equality regarding morale, entitlements and resources 
(Nussbaum, 2006). 
11 Equal: It is based on the capacity to think of a certain sense of justice, this is, the capacity 
to make rational, autonomous, moral choices (Nussbaum, 2006). 
12 Independent: according to contract theories, individuals must not dominate or depend on 
others (Nussbaum, 2006), which leaves children, the elderly and the disabled (formerly 
women as well, and today we could also add pensioners) out of the foundation of the political 
space.  
13 The conception of the initial position is indeed a good hypothesis to lay the foundations for 
an egalitarian political society. Wealth, social class or status as sources of differences in 
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socio-political power are left aside in fair political systems, because men are equal in the 
hypothetical state of nature and this natural equality legitimises the political principles of 
society. Nowadays, no one would accept these differences and liberalism has much to do with 
the assault on feudal and monarchical traditions that made these differences legitimate.  
14 The dependent are not only taken out of the scope of justice but they are also envisaged as 
second-class citizens with fewer rights. Additionally, care is assigned to a traditionally 
considered second-class social group: women. In the case of Spain, the State has treated 
women in a paternalistic way, enacting work-life conciliation and dependency laws.  
15 However, Nussbaum does not refer to other visions of human nature that are closer to the 
goodness than to the conflict and that also lay the foundation for the contract. It is Rousseau’s 
idea that man is born good. Even Kant, who was always between Rousseau and Hume, 
envisaged the most ambiguous human nature: unsocial sociability. 
16 The ten Central Capabilities are:  
Life 
Bodily Health 
Bodily Integrity 
Sense, Imagination and Thought 
Emotion 
Practical Reason 
Affiliation 
Other Species 
Play 
Control Over One’s Environement 
17 A new definition of dignity that does not exclude anyone and does not make some human 
beings worthier than others; a definition that does not give rise to two categories of 
citizenship and does not associate dignity to rationality. This definition is not based upon 
moral autonomy or the capacity for reason and moral choice, but rather upon equal humanity. 
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